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Aspen Financial Services, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Dec. 06, 2012)
1
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS 
 
Summary 
 
The Court considered a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus in response to a 
district court’s denial of a motion to stay certain testimonial discovery in a civil proceeding 
occurring simultaneously to a criminal investigation. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Although the district court has the power to stay a civil proceeding in the interest of 
fairness, it is constitutionally permissible for both a civil proceeding and a criminal investigation 
to proceed concurrently.  Ultimately, the district court’s determination regarding whether a stay 
is warranted is a discretionary decision that comes at the end of a careful balancing of the 
interests involved. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Plaintiffs suffered substantial losses from investments they made with defendant-
petitioners. Believing the losses to be a result of fraud, plaintiffs brought suit against petitioners 
in district court. Additionally, and at the behest of plaintiffs, the F.B.I. initiated a criminal 
investigation of petitioners for their alleged fraudulent activities. Petitioners filed a motion to 
stay any depositions and written discovery in the civil proceeding that would require any of their 
employees or representatives to make testimonial statements. The district court denied the 
motion without prejudice, and petitioners asked the Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition 
directing the district court to grant the stay.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Saitta wrote the unanimous opinion for the Court sitting en banc. 
 
 While writs are generally not available to review discovery orders,
2
 in some narrow 
instances, writ relief may be available when it is necessary to prevent discovery that would cause 
privileged information to irretrievably lose its confidential nature.
3
 Accordingly, the Court 
considers the writ petition because, absent a stay, the petitioners would have to choose between 
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waiving their Fifth Amendment privilege in the civil deposition and risk revealing information to 
criminal investigators,
4
 or invoke the privilege and lose the ability to deny allegations against 
them.
5
 
 
The district court’s denial of the motion to stay the civil proceedings is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion because “[d]etermining how to proceed in response to a civil litigant’s 
request for accommodation of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is 
a matter within the discretion of the district court.”6 Despite petitioners’ claim that they would be 
unable to defend themselves if the stay was not granted and their employees or representatives 
were forced either to testify or to raise their Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court acted 
well within its discretion in determining that the stay was unnecessary. 
 
While the Fifth Amendment privilege can be raised in both criminal and civil 
proceedings,
7
 a predicament arises when the same transactions or issue give rise to parallel civil 
and criminal actions. On the one hand, the civil proceeding can vitiate the protections afforded 
the accused in the criminal proceeding if the prosecutor can use information obtained from him 
through civil discovery.
8
 On the other hand, the criminal proceeding can impede the search for 
truth in the civil proceeding if the accused asserts his privilege against self-incrimination.
9
 To 
resolve this dilemma, the Court has instructed district courts to, upon timely motion, balance the 
divergent interests implicated when a civil litigant invokes the Fifth Amendment.
10
 
 
The specific accommodation of a stay of civil proceedings is addressed by the Court for 
the first time in this case, so the Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. The Court 
noted that “a defendant has no constitutional right to a stay simply because a parallel criminal 
proceeding is in the works.”11 A stay “is an extraordinary remedy appropriate for extraordinary 
circumstances.”12 Thus, “[a] movant must carry a heavy burden” in order to demonstrate that a 
stay is warranted.
13
 Determining whether to grant a stay of civil proceedings during the pendency 
of criminal proceedings is a fact-intensive, case-by-case determination that requires a delicate 
balancing of the “competing interests involved in the case.”14 
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The Court followed the framework set forth by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for 
analyzing whether to grant such a stay. Under the framework, courts should analyze “the extent 
to which the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are implicated,”15 as well as the following 
nonexhaustive factors: 
 
(1) The interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with [the] litigation 
or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; 
(2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on 
defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and 
the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the 
civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal 
litigation.
16
 
 
The Court applied the Ninth Circuit test to the instant case.
17
 First, the extent to which a 
party’s Fifth Amendment privilege is implicated is generally determined by reference to the 
overlap between the civil and criminal cases and the status of the criminal matter.
18
 The Court 
found significant overlap between the subjects of the civil lawsuit and the criminal investigation, 
as they both involved the same financial activities by petitioners. Turning to the status of the 
criminal proceeding, the Court noted that the need for a stay is “far weaker” when, as in this 
case, “[n]o indictment has been returned.”19 As a general rule, preindictment requests for a stay 
are denied “because there is less risk of self-incrimination, and more uncertainty about the effect 
of a delay on the civil case.”20 The touchstone for evaluating a preindictment motion to stay is 
considering whether “special circumstances” justify granting a stay despite the absence of an 
indictment, such as when a formal indictment is “an eventuality”21 or when the government has 
initiated the civil proceeding and also controls the simultaneous criminal investigation.
22
  
 
The Court found that while the plaintiffs were providing criminal investigators with 
discovery obtained in their civil action, this is quite different from a situation in which the 
government is a party in parallel criminal and civil proceedings.
23
 The Court, furthermore, found 
no support from the record that the prosecutors sought control of civil discovery or that the 
interaction was improper.  
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In considering the plaintiffs’ interests and potential prejudice, the Court observed that 
plaintiffs have “an obvious interest in proceeding expeditiously.”24 The delay resulting from a 
stay may also “duly frustrate a plaintiff’s ability to put on an effective case” because as time 
elapses, “witnesses become unavailable, memories of conversations and dates fade, and 
documents can be lost or destroyed.”25 The stay may also impede the plaintiffs’ ability to obtain 
“negative inferences” from defendants’ refusal to testify.26 Thus, the prejudice that a stay would 
pose on the plaintiffs is acute. 
 
Next, the Court considered the burdens on the defendants. The primary burden posed by 
denying the stay and proceeding with both actions is the danger in undermining a defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If the defendant asserts the privilege, she 
is unable to defend her position, and raises negative inferences from her refusal to testify; if the 
defendant testifies, she effectively waives her privilege and all the information she provides can 
later be used against her in a criminal proceeding.
27
 In addition, a defendant testifying in a civil 
action may inadvertently “reveal[] his weak points to the criminal prosecutor,”28 may have to 
divert resources needed for his criminal defense,
29
 and may help broaden the scope of criminal 
discovery.
30
 The Court found that while these are heavy burdens, they are largely conjectural, as 
it is not possible to predict the length of the criminal investigation, or whether it will lead to an 
indictment. While the Court did not take the burdens the defendants may face lightly, there was 
only a faint probability that these dangers would be manifested. 
 
The Court then turned to the district court’s interest in convenience and efficiency, which 
is “deserving of substantial weight.”31 This interest “is best served when motions to stay 
proceedings are discouraged.”32 The Court stated that “a policy of freely granting stays solely 
because a litigant is defending simultaneous multiple suits would threaten to become a constant 
source of delay and an interference with judicial administration.”33 The fact the no indictments 
have been issued would make a stay indefinite and protracted and would thus interfere with the 
Court’s interest in managing its caseload expeditiously, which is intensified in complex 
litigation.
34
 The Court also found that although petitioners emphasized that they only sought to 
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stay certain depositions, those were central to the case, and would all but grind the case to a 
halt.
35
  
 
Finally, after finding that the case does not implicate the interests of any nonparties, the 
Court addressed the interest of the public in the civil and criminal matters. The Court noted that 
the public has an interest in the prompt resolution of cases,
36
 particularly claims brought to 
remedy the “[d]issemination of false or misleading information by companies to members of the 
investing public.”37 Because the present case involved claims of a large-scale real estate scam, 
the Court found that the public has an undoubtedly strong interest in rooting out such activity as 
quickly as possible. Thus, the delay flowing from a stay would shake the public’s confidence in 
the administration of justice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, on balance, the interests 
of the defendants in a stay do not outweigh the countervailing interests involved, and thus the 
writ petition was denied. 
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